Lisäksi EU tuntuu haluavan viestien lisäksi murtaa salausta ja laitteitakin yleisemminkin:
Going Dark: The war on encryption is on the rise
https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=40426701Here is the latest.
The bill could not be passed on Spain’s presidency. The presidency is now on Belgium and Stasi-fans are trying to get this bill passed again, hoping not to cause too much noise this time.
The text of the bill was modified a bit, and this time they added an exception, though
- Politicians and police are not subject to monitoring, only ordinal citizens messages’ should be wiretapped
https://european-pirateparty.eu/chatcontrol-eu-ministers-wan...
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> Politicians and police are not subject to monitoring, only ordinal citizens messages’ should be wiretapped
Of course, in 1984, their instruction manual, the top members of the party can turn their telescreens off.
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> Stefan Hector, a representative of the Swedish Police Authority, said that “a society cannot accept that criminals today have a space to communicate safely in order to commit serious crimes.”[0] A week later, it was revealed that the Swedish police had been infiltrated and were leaking information to criminals.[1]
Nyt samoja tavoitteita yritetään saavuttaa uudella "Going Dark"-nimellä ja taas lapsilla ratsastamalla:
Going Dark: The war on encryption is on the rise. Through a shady collaboration between the US and the EU.
https://mullvad.net/en/why-privacy-matters/going-darkUnder the slogan ‘Think of the children’, the European Commission tried to introduce total surveillance of all EU citizens. When the scandal was revealed, it turned out that American tech companies and security services had been involved in the bill, generally known as ‘Chat Control’ – and that the whole thing had been directed by completely different interests. Now comes the next attempt. New battering rams have been brought out with the ‘Going Dark’ initiative. But the ambition is the same: to install state spyware on every European cell phone and computer.
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The rhetoric was clear from day one: it was all about the children, and when it comes to children, there’s nothing we can’t imagine doing to keep them safe. So Ylva Johansson put forward a proposal that meant total surveillance of all EU citizens and as soon as someone opposed it, she pulled out the think-of-the-children card. But those who could see through the bluff quickly gave the proposal (those parts of the bill that dealt with internet surveillance) a shorter and more appropriate name: Chat Control.
In brief, Chat Control essentially meant that the communications of every EU citizen would be monitored. Every call, every message and every chat, all the emails, photos, and videos saved in cloud services – all of it would be filtered in real time via artificial intelligence and then checked in a newly established EU center, in close cooperation with Europol.
Nämä salauskiellot rikkoisivat monia kansainvälisiä sopimuksia, mutta se ei tunnu EU-johtoa häiritsevän:
Since the bill was in violation of the European Convention on Human Rights, the EU Charter and the UN Declaration of Human Rights, Chat Control was rejected by one legislative body after another. Both the Council of Ministers and the European Commission’s own legal service warned against the proposal, as did the European Parliament’s Data Protection
Board.
The UN Human Rights Council described Chat Control as incompatible with fundamental human rights and stated that the proposal would lead to mass surveillance and self-censorship. Former judges at the European Court of Justice said that the proposal was in breach of the EU Charter of
Rights and 465 researchers joined forces to warn of the consequences.
Faced with massive criticism, Ylva Johansson defended herself. According to her, everyone else had misunderstood the bill. Chat Control was certainly not about mass surveillance and everyone making that claim was simply out to discredit her.
Salauskielto vaarantaisi mm. oppositiopoliitikot, väärinkäytöksistä kertovat tietovuotajat, journalist ja heidän lähteensään, haavoittuvassa asemassa olevat henkilöt jotka elävät salaisella identiteetillä, kauppasalaisuudet ja jopa kansainvälisen turvallisuuden kannalta tärkeät tiedot:
All messaging services (including encrypted services such as Signal) would be covered by the law and would be forced to scan their users’ images, videos and conversations. That would be a big concern for all those who don’t use Meta or Google to converse because they are in need of secure communication methods. In other words, political opponents, whistleblowers, journalists and their sources, vulnerable people living under secret identities and others, not to mention people with trade secrets, and those in possession of
sensitive information important for national security. For example, the European Commission itself uses Signal. Demanding government transparency (either through so-called backdoors or scanning on the computer or phone) would open a Pandora’s box to countries with authoritarian inclinations (and five EU countries have already been caught using spyware to monitor political opponents) and would leave the door wide open for criminals to exploit. But it was not only this that separated the existing legislation from the draft bill that the European Commission wanted to introduce.
The previous legislation had only allowed scanning for material that had previously been stamped and registered as child pornography material. Now, AI would be used to find ‘new material’ and would also look for grooming attempts. Quite obviously, Chat Control would therefore send every other citizen of the EU straight into the filtering system.
Jos skannataan tekoälyllä tms muutakin jo ennalta tunnettua lapsipornoa, niin väärät positiiviset havainnot ovat erittäin yleisiä ja johtavat salauksen murtamiseen, vaikka sisältö ei siis olisikaan mitään lapsipornoa tms:
The European Commission, led by Ylva Johansson, received criticism from all directions. Police chiefs pointed out that most of the material they receive today involves teenagers sending pictures to each other and that such reports risk leading the police in the wrong direction.
Scanning tests carried out by European police on existing material showed that 80-90 percent of all hits were false positives.
Now, moreover, ‘new material’ would be scanned – which would obviously mean an impossible administrative burden merely to distinguish between illegal images and holiday pictures from family days on the beach. The error rate would clearly be approaching 100 percent. For a European justice system that even today is unable to follow up all the tips it receives, this would be devastating. And criminals would, of course, turn to illegal messaging services. No children would be helped. At the same time, every EU citizen would have spyware installed on their phones.
Sen lisäksi EU on käyttänyt rahaa mikrotargetoituun asian mainostamiseen, käyttänyt tutkimuksen mukaan propagandaluonteen saanutta Eurobarometria apuna ja hankkeen tueksi on tekaistu EU:n yms rahalla pika-aikataululla erilaisia muka lasten etuja ajavia järjestöjä lobbaamaan hanketta:
How did Ylva Johansson deal with this information? Not at all. Instead, like a scratched record, she continued urging everyone to “think of the children.” She also ordered a survey that said 80 percent of the EU population supports Chat Control. The problem? The European Commission used its Eurobarometer series of public opinion surveys in a way that
opened it to accusations of blurring the line between research and propaganda. When asked to comment on the Chat Control survey, the Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies concluded that it had a political agenda and consisted of questions that were biased to support the Commission’s plans.
Ylva Johansson was employing blatant deception. She used incorrect figures and biased surveys. In interviews, she was populist and evasive. But she was forced to resort to these methods. Because it was never about the children.
Skannaustekniikkaa, joka kauppaa tekniikkaa joka ei tosiasiassa toimi, on myymässä seksiskandaalista kärähtynyttä yhtäväänsä puolustamalla ryvettynyt Aston Kutcher Thornin johdossa. Thorn on kaiken lisäksi ilmoittanut itsensä hyväntekeväisyysjärjestöksi, vaikka on myymässä palveluaan, mitä tuntuu esiintyvän enemmänkin:
For several years Kutcher lobbied the European Commission (until he was forced to resign as chairman of Thorn’s board after defending his acting colleague Danny Masterson when he was convicted of rape). He held meetings with others at the European Commission and had an extra close relationship with the Commission’s Eva Kaili (until she was convicted of bribery).
So here was an American company in direct contact with the European Commission. An American company that just happened to sell the technology that could be used if Chat Control was introduced. In addition, it was all based on a false premise. The technology Kutcher and Johansson talked about did not exist. Expert after expert condemned their talk of sniffer dogs.
And here’s yet another seedy aspect to this scandal: in the EU transparency register, Thorn was registered as a charitable organization – despite selling the technology they were lecturing about in the EU. The trick of disguising organizations and corporations as charities would turn out to be a recurring motif.
Tässä joitain hankkeen tueksi tekaistuja järjestöjä:
Since the draft Chat Control bill was presented, Ylva Johansson has constantly referred to children’s rights organizations that support her proposal. She has worked with them in a PR context, as a way to show how Chat Control has the support of independent, nonprofit organizations that care about children. A central organization in this work has been the WeProtect Global Alliance. When Zandonini, Fotiadis, and Stavinoha published their article, it turned out that the European Commission had been involved in founding this organization, and that it included representatives from both tech companies and security services in different countries. Ylva Johansson’s colleague in the European Commission, Labrador Jimenez, was on the Board of Directors of WeProtect, together with Thorn’s CEO Julie Cordua, representatives of Interpol, and government officials from the US and the UK (the latter simultaneously pursuing its own monitoring legislation, also using children as the battering ram). Thorn had put a great deal of money into WeProtect. The European Commission had contributed one million euros. In other words, it wasn’t children’s rights organizations that were supporting Ylva Johansson. It was lobbying organizations set up by the European Commission to get the bill through.
The Board of Directors of WeProtect also included representatives from the Oak Foundation, who, in addition to their involvement in WeProtect, had also been involved in setting up ECLAG (another charity that supported the Chat Control proposal). ECLAG was launched just a few weeks after Ylva Johansson’s draft bill was presented, and Thorn was also represented on this organization’s board. And there was still another organization: the Brave Movement, an organization formed a month before the proposed Chat Control bill was introduced. Brave was launched with $10 million from the Oak Foundation and a strategy paper discovered by the journalists stated that “once the EU Survivors taskforce is established and we are clear on the mobilized survivors, we will establish a list pairing responsible survivors with Members of the European Parliament – we will ‘divide and conquer’ the MEPs by deploying in priority survivors from MEPs’ countries of origin.”
The Oak Foundation also appeared in an article carried out by the
Intercept.
In 2023, an American organization called the Heat Initiative was formed. On paper, they were a “new child safety group” and the first thing they did was campaign for Apple to “detect, report, and remove” child pornography material from iCloud. Apple responded that this would be something that criminals would be able to exploit and that it could also
lead to a “potential for a slippery slope of unintended consequences. Scanning for one type of content, for instance, opens the door for bulk surveillance.”
The Heat Initiative did not like this answer and fought back with anti-Apple propaganda on large advertising billboards in American cities under the theme of ‘think of the children.’ But who was behind the Heat Initiative, besides the Oak Foundation? Heat was led by a former vice president at Thorn. The Intercept article also referred to the fact that Thorn was working with Palantir, the big-data company that helped the NSA mass-monitor the whole world and was involved in the Cambridge Analytica scandal where Facebook users’ private messages and data were used to influence the presidential election on behalf of Donald Trump in 2016.
In other words, the European Commission was involved in funding and starting up charities with the aim of exploiting existing victims to emotionally influence EU parliamentarians. In close cooperation with the tech company providing the technology that would be used in the implementation of the monitoring. Together with representatives of non-European security services. As part of a larger apparatus, where the same tactics were used to influence developments in the United States.
At the same time, the real organizations working to counter sexual crimes against children were wondering why the European Commission was refusing to talk to them. In the same investigative report, Offlimits, Europe’s oldest hotline for vulnerable children, tells how Ylva Johansson would rather go to Silicon Valley to meet companies interested in making huge profits than talk to them.
Hankkeen taakse ei ole kysytty juuri lainkaan ulkopuolisia tieteellisiä näkemyksiä:
The same is true of the technical experts. Matthew Green, Professor of Cryptography at John Hopkins University, said: “In the first impact assessment of the EU Commission there was almost no outside scientific input and that’s really amazing since Europe has a terrific scientific infrastructure, with the top researchers in cryptography and computer
security all over the world.”
However, Europol was involved in drafting the law, together with security services from other countries. In July 2022, Europol wrote that it wanted to be able to use scanning and surveillance for purposes other than sexual offenses against children. The European Commission responded that it understood the wish but that it had “to be realistic in terms of what could be expected, given the many sensitivities around the proposal.” Thorn was also clear in understanding that the scanning could later be used for other
purposes:
“When considering regulation or legislation on encryption it should not be done solely focusing on CSAM. Solutions for detection in encrypted environments are much broader than one single crime,” the company wrote in one document.
Kuten mainittua, EU sitten mikrotargetoidulla mainostamisella lobbnasi hankettaan päättäjille eri maissa, mutta piilotti sen henkilöiltä, jotka olisivat sitä vastustaneet:
When articles were published about the EU Commission’s horrifyingly undemocratic approach, Ylva Johansson’s office at the European Commission responded by advertising on the platform X (formerly Twitter). They targeted advertisements (pro Chat Control) so that decision-makers in different countries would see them, but also so that they would not be seen by people suspected to be strongly against the proposal. The advertising was also targeted on the basis of religious and political affiliation and thus violated the EU’s own laws regarding micro-targeting.
Kun edellinen hanke alkoi ajautua ongelmiin, uutta ja vielä laajemmalle ulottuvaa hanketta alettiin ajaa "Going Dark"-nimellä. Samalla poistettiin export-nimitys hankkeelta, jotta sitä koskisi entistä vähemmän julkisuussäännöt ja sitä saataisiin ajettua salassa eteenpäin:
New attempt at mass surveillance via the Going Dark initiative
While the EU member states in the Council were trying to come up with various compromise proposals to implement chat control, they were also working on a plan B and new attempts for mass surveillance legislation. During Sweden’s EU Presidency in spring 2023, a project called Going Dark was initiated. The idea from the Swedish Presidency was initially that a so-called High Level Expert Group would be launched. The task of putting together the group went to the European Commission, which immediately removed the
‘Expert’ label. Instead of a High Level Expert Group, a High Level Group was formed. As the Netzpolitik newspaper put it: “Removing the word ‘expert’ is no small detail: special rules apply to Expert groups, for example when it comes to transparency. Rules
that do not apply to High Level Groups.”
En syytä huomata, että nyt hanke on laajentunut jo viestien lähettämisestä myös pääsystä materiaaliin joka on ihmisten tietokoneilla tai kännyköissä. Eli halutaan takaovi salaukseen myös ihmisten laitteilla, eikä vain viestinvälitykseen:
Some challenges were identified as particularly pressing: access to encrypted material (both stored data and communication), data storage, location data, and anonymization (including VPNs and Darknets).
The group was divided into three working groups: the first would work with access to data on users’ devices (computer and mobile), the second group would focus on access to data in the services’ systems (messaging apps, for example), and the third group would discuss access to data in transit.
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Future legislative proposals from the European Commission could thus be assumed to be about providing access to data on users’ devices and in the messaging services’ systems, and to data in transit. Patrick Breyer, who had worked hard to counter Chat Control, said the group was just an extension of past offensives and that Going Dark was working to
introduce illegal mass surveillance.
Mielenkiintoisesti niin paljon tietosuojaa vastustava hanke itse visusti salaa jopa tiedot henkilöistä, jotka osallistuvat hankkeen kokouksiin:
When he requested documents from the group’s meetings and a list of the attendees, he received a document with the information blacked out as if classified. The European Commission had thus put together a working group aiming to achieve mass surveillance of the broader population while not being transparent about who was part of the group. It was like a scratched record. Gone was the old excuse “think of the children”, but the goal was the same.
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From the Swedish side, the Ministry of Justice was represented at the Going Dark meetings, but so was the Swedish Security Service (Säpo) and the Swedish Police Authority. Together with representatives from the other Member States, they used the High Level Group meetings to discuss how, through legislation, encrypted services could be required to provide data in readable format. Several Member States argued that “the working groups needed to look at solutions that involved ‘legal access through design’.” This was something that pleased American representatives.
YK on määritellyt salauksen ihmisoikeudeksi, mutta sekään ei hanketta tunnu estävän:
Although the UN classifies encryption as a human
right, the Going Dark initiative and the European police force were fighting to smash end-to-end encryption. Their first move actually came as a reaction to Meta rolling out exactly such encryption.
Europol’s move was only an initial indication. At the end of May 2024, the Going Dark initiative resulted in 42 recommendations to the European Commission. The document notes that encryption adds a level of complexity when it comes to accessing real time content data, specially from messaging services implementing an end-to-end Encryption. It states that law enforcement need access to data en clair (i.e. in plain text) through “lawful access without weakening privacy.” The Going Dark initiative emphasizes the principle of “security through encryption and security despite encryption” as a central tenet.
The Going Dark initiative shows the same tendencies as the chat control proposal. Once again, experts have been excluded from the discussions, and ministers and police representatives have once again missed the main point: either end-to-end encrypted communication is private and secure, or it is not.
Aiemminkin länsimaiden vaatimia takaportteja on esimerkiksi Kiinakin sitten hyödyntänyt omaan vakoilutoimintaansa:
The US authorities have already tested the backdoors that the European Going Dark initiative is now seeking. They have seen the evidence: it is impossible to implement backdoors in a secure way, without hostile states or hackers being able to exploit them. Edward Snowden revealed that the NSA spent $250 million a year getting tech companies to install backdoors in their services, which also exposed the risks of backdoors. In 2010, Chinese hackers managed to use a Google backdoor to get into Gmail. The same thing happened in 2005, when state surveillance of Vodafone was exploited by outside actors to bug the Greek Prime Minister, his Foreign Minister, Justice Minister, and a hundred other government officials.
Aihe: Yksityisyys, tietoturva, vakoilu, salaaminen (Luettu 11354 kertaa)