Kirjoittaja Aihe: Yleinen väestötiedeketju  (Luettu 172077 kertaa)

kriittinen_ajattelija

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« Vastaus #540 : 03.04.2019, 11:42:43 »
part 3
All we're really doing is just fighting the clock, and it always wins.

kriittinen_ajattelija

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« Vastaus #541 : 03.04.2019, 11:43:26 »
part 4
All we're really doing is just fighting the clock, and it always wins.

kriittinen_ajattelija

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« Vastaus #542 : 03.04.2019, 11:48:35 »
part 5
All we're really doing is just fighting the clock, and it always wins.

kriittinen_ajattelija

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« Vastaus #543 : 03.04.2019, 12:00:16 »
part 6
All we're really doing is just fighting the clock, and it always wins.

kriittinen_ajattelija

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« Vastaus #544 : 03.04.2019, 12:09:56 »
part 7
« Viimeksi muokattu: 03.04.2019, 12:18:13 kirjoittanut kriittinen_ajattelija »
All we're really doing is just fighting the clock, and it always wins.

Tommi Korhonen

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« Vastaus #545 : 04.04.2019, 09:31:44 »
Kiitos Kriittiselle Ajattelijalle. Todella mielenkiintoisia kaaviota!

Muuten aika järkeenkäyviä, mutta tuo väkivallan käyttömahdollisuus nuorten akateemisten parissa taitaa todistaa siitä mistä YouTubessa on puhuttu; opiskelijat ja liberaalit ovat kahjoja.

Myöhempi diagrammi sitten kertoo onneksi, että keskimääräinen yleisö on maltillista, ja että (molemmat) ääripäät ovat ääriainesta.

Lähetetty minun SM-G930F laitteesta Tapatalkilla

Kerrassaan toivoton tilanne. Kaikki muut eduskuntapuolueet kannattavat suomalaisvastaista politiikkaa. Perussuomalaiset ovat ohjelmatasolla hyvä, mutta sillä on lampaan rohkeus.

kriittinen_ajattelija

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« Vastaus #546 : 09.04.2019, 11:31:25 »
Lainaus
Äitiys muut­taa nais­ten ar­vo­ja pe­rin­tei­sem­mik­si

Perinteiset arvot tulevat naisille tärkeiksi, kun he saavat lapsia. Miesten arvomaailma sen sijaan ei muutu isyyden myötä. Tämän takia uudet vanhemmat voivat arvojen osalta liukua erilleen toisistaan.

Helsingin yliopiston Svenska social- och kommunalhögskolanissa tehdyssä uudessa tutkimuksessa osoitetaan, että vanhemmaksi tulo muuttaa naisten arvoja aiempaa konservatiivisempaan tai perinteisempään suuntaan.

Arvot ovat elämää ohjaavia periaatteita, toisin sanoen ihanteita, joita kohden pyritään. Konservatiiviset tai perinteiset arvot tarkoittavat sitä, että arvostetaan maanläheisyyttä, perinteitä, sääntöjä ja turvallisuutta, eletään enemmän muitten ihmisten odotusten mukaan, eikä muutokseen suhtauduta kovin avoimin mielin.

Aiemmissa tutkimuksissa on osoitettu, että lapsia saaneilla on perinteisemmät arvot kuin lapsettomilla ihmisillä. Sosiaalipsykologian professori Jan-Erik Lönnqvist on tutkinut, johtuuko tämä omasta valinnasta, eli onko siis niin, että perinteisten arvojen mukaisesti ajattelevat perustavat muita useammin perheen, vain muuttaako vanhemmuus arvoja perinteisempään suuntaan.

Tutkimuksessa käytettiin psykologiassa yleisimmin hyväksyttyä Schwartzin arvoteoriaa (1992). Teorian mukaan arvot asettuvat akseleille muutosvalmius – säilyttäminen sekä itsensä ylittäminen – itsensä korostaminen.

Lönnqvist hyödynsi aluksi kattavaa ja edustavaa European Social Surveyn dataa (n = 12 850), joka varmensi aiemmat tutkimustulokset ja josta ilmeni, että lapsen saaneiden suomalaisten naisten arvot olivat konservatiivisempia kuin lapsettomien naisten. Aiemmissa tutkimuksissa on osoittautunut, että naisten arvot ovat perinteisempiä kuin miesten. Toisessa tutkimuksessa Lönnqvist seurasi lähes 150:tä paria (n = 292) aina raskauden alussa olleesta ensimmäisestä neuvolakäynnistä aikaan kolme kuutta synnytyksen jälkeen nähdäkseen, tapahtuiko arvoissa muutoksia tänä aikana. Parit arvioivat sekä omia että partnerinsa arvoja.

– Sekä naisten oman että miesten arvion mukaan naisten arvot olivat siirtyneet konservatiiviseen suuntaan synnytyksen jälkeen. Miesten arvoissa sen sijaan ei ollut muutoksia, Lönnqvist kertoo.

Tuloksista ilmeni myös, että naiset arvioivat miesten arvojen muuttuneen samalla tavalla kuin omiensakin, vaikka miehet eivät kokeneet omien arvojensa muuttuneen.

– On mielenkiintoista, että naiset ja miehet arvioivat miesten arvojen muutoksen eri tavoin. Aiemmissa tutkimuksissa on ilmennyt, että uudet vanhemmat riitelevät paljon ja eroavat usein. Voisiko tähän olla syynä se, että parien arvomaailmat liukuvat erilleen lasten saamisen jälkeen? Tätä voi pahentaa se, että naiset uskovat miesten arvojen muuttuneen samoin kuin omiensakin, ja heillä on siksi miesten suhteen vääriä odotuksia.

Vanhemmuus ei muuttanut mitään arvoakselilla itsensä ylittäminen – itsensä korostaminen.

Hy­vin­voin­tiyh­teis­kun­ta ta­soit­taa ero­ja

Lönnqvist sanoo hämmästyneensä sitä, ettei vanhemmuus vaikuttanut miesten arvoihin lainkaan.

– Eräänä syynä tähän voi olla, että naiset edelleenkin kantavat päävastuun lasten kasvatuksesta, ja vanhemmuus vaikuttaa naisten elämään enemmän. Sen tähden sellaiset arvot kuten turvallisuus ja vakaus ovat heille myös tärkeämpiä. Monet miehet jatkavat työelämässä entiseen tapaan.

Ura oli kuitenkin tärkeä naisille myös äidiksi tulemisen jälkeen. Lönnqvist uskoo suomalaisen hyvinvointiyhteiskunnan vaikuttaneen tuloksiin.

– Olisi mielenkiintoista tehdä sama tutkimus maissa, joissa ei ole samanlaista hyvinvointirakennelmaa kuin meillä ja joissa naiset usein jäävät kotiin, esimerkiksi Sveitsissä tai Yhdysvalloissa. Uskoakseni miesten ja naisten arvojen erot voivat sellaisissa tapauksissa olla vieläkin suurempia.

Lönnqvist aikoo jatkaa parien seuraamista selvittääkseen, muuttuvatko miesten arvot lasten kasvaessa ja miesten totuttua uuteen elämäntilanteeseen vai palaavatko naisten arvot entisenlaisiksi, sekä sitä, kuinka nämä arvomuutokset vaikuttavat parisuhteisiin.
https://www.helsinki.fi/fi/uutiset/talous-yhteiskunta/aitiys-muuttaa-naisten-arvoja-perinteisemmiksi



Lainaus
Euroopan rikostilastot: Ruotsi ykkönen, Virossa vähiten rikollisuutta. Katso tilasto

Kuka olisi uskonut, että Ruotsissa on enemmän rikollisuutta kuin vaikka Ukrainassa, Venäjällä tai Albaniassa? Löysän matupolitiikan maat Belgia, Ranska ja Italia ovat myös rikollisuuden Top10 maita, unohtamatta tietenkään multikulti-hulluttelun sydänmaata Iso-Britanniaa, joka varmisti paikkansa sijalla 8.

Ykkösmaalla Ruotsilla on Suomesta aikamoinen etumatka. Koska Suomessa kuitenkin aina kiivetään ahteri edellä puuhun ja apinoidaan kaikki ruotsalaisten hulluttelut, niin ennen pitkää varmistamme paikkamme Ruotsin rinnalla Euroopan rikosrikkaimpien maiden kärkikaksikossa.

Rank   Country   Crime Index   Safety Index
1   Sweden   49.35   50.65
2   Ukraine   48.88   51.12
3   France   46.39   53.61
4   Moldova   45.45   54.55
5   Italy   45.02   54.98
6   Ireland   44.52   55.48
7   Bosnia And Herzegovina   43.79   56.21
8   United Kingdom   42.72   57.28
9   Belgium   42.46   57.54
10   Russia   41.93   58.07
11   Montenegro   40.48   59.52
12   Albania   40.30   59.70
13   Bulgaria   40.00   60.00
14   Macedonia   39.29   60.71
15   Greece   38.57   61.43
16   Serbia   37.27   62.73
17   Latvia   36.77   63.23
18   Lithuania   36.51   63.49
19   Norway   35.32   64.68
20   Hungary   35.17   64.83
21   Germany   34.51   65.49
22   Malta   33.53   66.47
23   Spain   32.46   67.54
24   Portugal   32.13   67.87
25   Poland   30.09   69.91
26   Slovakia   29.54   70.46
27   Luxembourg   29.07   70.93
28   Netherlands   28.57   71.43
29   Romania   27.84   72.16
30   Czech Republic   26.66   73.34
31   Croatia   24.69   75.31
32   Denmark   24.25   75.75
33   Belarus   23.53   76.47
34   Iceland   23.28   76.72
35   Finland   22.80   77.20
36   Slovenia   22.57   77.43
37   Switzerland   21.50   78.50
38   Austria   21.37   78.63
39   Estonia   20.80   79.20
https://mvlehti.net/2019/04/06/euroopan-rikostilastot-ruotsi-ykkonen-ukraina-kakkonen-virossa-vahiten-rikollisuutta/
https://www.numbeo.com/crime/rankings_by_country.jsp?title=2019&region=150&fbclid=IwAR2oMpQsdtgCf6VEnQlCoomA6a4fqxhqkfsPY1LPMZT1LGOAGfLAH7vnvjE
« Viimeksi muokattu: 11.04.2019, 10:40:36 kirjoittanut kriittinen_ajattelija »
All we're really doing is just fighting the clock, and it always wins.

Charlie

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« Vastaus #547 : 10.04.2019, 02:58:29 »
Huomioidaan nyt kuitenkin @kriittinen_ajattelija ettei nuo luvut ole mitenkään kovin virallisia vaan perustuvat tuolla sivustolla käyvien arvioihin. Suuntaa saattavat antaa.

Lainaus
This section is based on surveys from visitors of this website. Questions for these surveys are similar to many similar scientific and government surveys.

Each entry in the survey is saved as the number in the range [-2, +2], with -2 having meaning of strongly negative and +2 meaning of strongly positive.

We filter surveys to eliminate potential spam, like people entering a large amount of data which are differentiating from the median value.

To present survey result, we use the scale [0, 100] for values since it is easier to read for users.

To generate a current index (which is always updated) we use data up to 36 months old. We include only cities for which there are at least a certain number of contributors. Our semiannual index is remade twice per year by pushing current index into this historical view.

Crime Index is an estimation of overall level of crime in a given city or a country. We consider crime levels lower than 20 as very low, crime levels between 20 and 40 as being low, crime levels between 40 and 60 as being moderate, crime levels between 60 and 80 as being high and finally crime levels higher than 80 as being very high.

Safety index is, on the other way, quite opposite of crime index. If the city has a high safety index, it is considered very safe.

Is this much less accurate than governmental statistics? In some countries, governments have a detailed statistics based on a number of reported crimes per capita. Those surveys are particular good in comparing crime between two cities in that country, but are not so good in cross country comparison for the following reasons:

- people in some countries are much more likely to report a crime than in other countries
- data could be forged by governmental institutions
- data are not available for most of the world

[...]

https://www.numbeo.com/crime/indices_explained.jsp

kriittinen_ajattelija

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« Vastaus #548 : 12.04.2019, 10:37:49 »
Lainaus
Kiinalaiset tutkijat siirsivät ihmisen "aivogeenejä" apinoihin – eläimistä saattoi tulla fiksumpia

Tieteiselokuva Apinoiden planeetta kuvaa maailmaa, jossa älykkäät apinat ovat ottaneet vallan. Nyt tuo dystooppinen visio saattaa olla pienen askeleen lähempänä todellisuutta.

Kiinassa tutkijat ovat nimittäin tehneet kokeen, jossa he siirsivät useille siirtogeenisille makakiapinoille kopioita ihmisen geenistä, jolla epäillään olevan vaikutus ihmisen älyn muodostumiseen, kertoo MIT Technology Review (siirryt toiseen palveluun) -lehti.

Tutkimus on julkaistu kiinalaisessa National Science Review (siirryt toiseen palveluun) -tiedejulkaisussa. Ensin aiheesta uutisoi kiinalainen China Daily (siirryt toiseen palveluun) -lehti.

Apinoiden muisti parani
Tutkimusta johtanut Kunming Institute of Zoology -tutkimuslaitoksen geneetikko Bing Su kertoi MIT Technology Reviewille, että kyseessä oli ensimmäinen yritys ymmärtää ihmisen kognition eli ajattelun kehitystä siirtogeenisten apinoiden avulla.

Tutkijoiden mukaan geenimuokatut apinat pärjäsivät tavallisia apinoita paremmin muistikokeissa ja niiden reaktioaika lyheni.

Muokattujen apinoiden aivot kehittyivät normaalien lajitovereiden aivoja hitaammin, aivan kuten ihmislasten aivot. Apinoiden aivojen koossa ei ollut eroa.

Länsimaiset tutkijat tyrmäävät
MIT Technology Reviewin mukaan useat länsimaiset tutkijat ovat arvostelleet tutkimusta vastuuttomaksi. He kyseenalaistavat kädellisten geneettisen muokkaamisen eettisyyden.

Kiinasta on tullut maailman johtava valtio tutkimuksissa, joissa käytetään koe-eläiminä kädellisiä. Kiinalaiset tutkijat hyödyntävät tutkimuksissaan uusimpia korkean teknologian työkaluja, joiden avulla voidaan muokata eliöiden perimää.

Coloradon yliopiston geneetikko James Sikela arvioi MIT Technology Reviewille, että siirtogeenisten apinoiden käyttäminen ihmisen aivojen kehitykseen liittyvissä tutkimuksissa on erittäin riskialtista.

Sikelaa huolestuttaa se, että kiinalaisten tekemä koe voi johtaa jatkossa yhä äärimmäisempiin apinoiden geenimuokkauksiin.

Tutkijoiden mukaan yksi eettinen ongelma on se, miten geenimuokattuja inhimillistettyjä apinoita kohdeltaisiin ja hoidettaisiin siten, että niillä voisi olla merkityksellinen elämä.
https://yle.fi/uutiset/3-10733348?fbclid=IwAR2SoK7DVFHED4ztzobitSsPP9oQaOTH23KNuNmSPuzOBLG84NrthkzqhFc
Meanwhile in China.


Lainaus
”Huh-HUH!” – Syntyvyys viimeksi näin alhaalla vuonna 1868
KASPERI SUMMANEN | 11.04.2019 | 15:10
Yli puolessa kunnista syntyi viime vuonna alle 50 lasta.

Aluetutkija Timo Aro on jakanut Twitterissä alla näkyvän paljon puhuvan kuvan syntyneiden määrästä vuonna 2018. Karttakuva perustuu Tilastokeskuksen lukuihin. Mitä syvemmin punainen kunta on kartalla, sitä pienempi oli syntyneiden määrä.

Kaikkiaan elävänä syntyneitä lapsia oli viime vuonna 47 307. Timo Aro huomauttaa, että syntyneiden määrä on ollut yhtä alhaalla viimeksi vuonna 1868. Se oli viimeinen kolmesta suuresta nälkävuodesta. Suomi koki tuolloin suurimman väestötappionsa, kun väkiluku väheni vuodessa yli 96 000 henkilöä. Suomen väkiluku oli tuolloin hieman yli 1,7 miljoonaa.

Aro toteaa, että useammassa kuin joka toisessa kunnassa syntyi viime vuonna alle 50 lasta ja lähes joka kolmannessa kunnassa ”alle koululuokallinen”.

– Huh-HUH, tutkija toteaa luvuista.

”Kuolemankierre”
Asiantuntijat ovat varoitelleet väestön ikääntymisen haasteista kansantaloudelle ja hyvinvointivaltiolle. Suomen Pankin johtokunnan neuvonantaja Lauri Kajanoja varoitti torstaina hyvinvointivaltion rahoituspohjan ajautuvan lähivuosina yhä huterammalle pohjalle. Kajanojan mukaan kyse on julkisen talouden ”kuolemankierteestä”, joka pitäisi katkaista työllisyyttä ja talouskasvua tukevilla uudistuksilla.

– Tämän asian mittaluokka on suuri, sillä meillä on tällä hetkellä noin 35 yli 65-vuotiasta sataa työikäistä kohden. Runsaan kymmenen vuoden kuluttua se on jo noin 45, eli tämä tulee aika nopeasti meille eteen, Lauri Kajanoja totesi Talous.tv:n haastattelussa.

– Suuret ikäluokat ovat jo pitkälti jääneet eläkkeelle. Nyt lähivuosina heidän hoitotarpeensa ennustetaan kasvavan merkittävästi. Ja siihen tulee menemään lisää rahaa, Kajanoja jatkoi.

Ekonomisti jakaa poliitikkojen vaihtoehdot kahteen kategoriaan: lyhyellä aikavälillä voidaan säästää menoissa tai kiristää verotusta. Pidemmällä tähtäimellä hyvinvointivaltion pohjaa voidaan tukea työllisyysastetta nostavilla rakenteellisilla uudistuksilla.
https://www.verkkouutiset.fi/huh-huh-syntyvyys-viimeksi-nain-alhaalla-vuonna-1868/
« Viimeksi muokattu: 12.04.2019, 12:29:08 kirjoittanut kriittinen_ajattelija »
All we're really doing is just fighting the clock, and it always wins.

kriittinen_ajattelija

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« Vastaus #549 : 14.04.2019, 12:31:23 »
Lainaus
“ Living in your own home forms a free and responsible person”
Alexey Navalny - about the low-rise Russia of the future


Russia must change the format of its daily life and make a civilization choice in favor of low-rise buildings, says Alexei Navalny, the founder of the Anti-Corruption Foundation. Living in your own home, in a circle of people who are not indifferent to the fate of a small community, creates another person who is free and responsible. Own home is another economy: it is followed by a new quality of consumption.

What is the main problem for you multi-storey suburbs?

One of the main causes of the problems of Russian cities is the endless multi-storey construction. For all of them, development is industrial housing, which results in the emergence of suburban multi-storey ghettos without roads and infrastructure.

In our continuing urbanization and suburbanization, the rights of the homeowner, the owner of the property, are not truly in demand. If we look at the speeches of any Western politicians of any level, we will constantly hear the word "community." In Russia, this is not, it is something obscure, because the community - the community - does not exist. The community is, for example, residents of neighboring houses in low-rise buildings. Their lives revolve around the home, the school, the local park and including the tax that they pay to the local budget.

People living in a multi-story anthill do not really need property rights, they do not need to worry about their land and property. This is one of the reasons why it is so easy for the authorities to take all powers to Moscow, why territories do not develop, why cities are degrading.

Former Finance Minister Alexei Kudrin, who is busy preparing a reform program for the government, is confident that Russia needs to focus on the 20 largest agglomerations in order to be a competitive country. But large cities in Russia are already growing. What is the problem?

When Alexei Kudrin says that Russia needs to grow 20 agglomerations to become competitive, he states the obvious thing: cities are growing all over the world. From rural areas, where earnings are lower, people are leaving for cities where they can earn and achieve a more comfortable standard of living. This is true. Another thing is that by the word "cities" we understand different things.

People leave for cities everywhere, but if we look at European and American cities, we will notice that they are quite low-rise. The reasons are in a different approach to land development in the existing buildings, in the city merger, in infrastructure development, and in high demand for single-family houses. The building density in the center of any city is high, but in the direction of the periphery both the density and the number of floors are reduced, and not increased, like ours. When we say that people move from villages to cities, this does not mean that they are doomed to be settled in an ant hill. They can comfortably settle in a one-story house. But Russia seems to be deliberately seeking to avoid this path.

What is the difference between the lifestyle in an individual house and the lifestyle in a multi-storey apartment building?

The differences are completely fundamental. Let's look at it both from the point of view of inhabitants, and from the point of view of the state. The type of urban development in Russia and the lifestyle of a Russian urban person must change: you must strive to ensure that people have the opportunity to move to low-rise or single-story housing. I look at another huge house, which is being built in the Moscow region: it has 25 floors, 10 entrances. I think that when a major overhaul time comes, it will be impossible to repair it. No matter how much money is collected from citizens on the housing and utilities program, the cost of repairing this house will be huge. I myself have lived in a high-rise building all my life; this is a panel house in Mar'ina. It very quickly comes into disrepair, it is extremely expensive to heat, to provide hot water and everything else. No residents will be able to repair it. Now Sergei Sobyanin is trying to relocate all of the five-story buildings, for example, into eight-story or twenty-story. And when the time comes for the renovation of these houses, where will we move the people? This time will come. People are not able to pay for repairs in their five-story buildings, and then the same will happen with new houses. We do our own to increase the size of the black hole utilities.

The cost of social infrastructure for the uninhabited high-rise areas is huge. We need schools for thousands of students, we need large polyclinics. Schools will be missed, in polyclinics there will be queues. To avoid queues, extraordinary measures are needed by the number of doctors, the number of offices, the location of clinics. And there are also domestic services, parking, shopping centers and other commercial infrastructure, which is lacking in new areas. As a state man, thinking of perspective, I make a rational choice in favor of low-rise housing.

Now look from the point of view of man. We want children to be born in families. Whatever happens to economic growth over large periods of time, economic growth is the work of people. Few people - no economic growth, many people - there is economic growth. It will be extremely difficult for us to convince people to give birth to a third and even second child, if the whole life perspective is an apartment in a high-rise building. With such a civilized choice, it is impossible to have many children. If you have two children in your family and one wanted a cat and another dog, then how can everyone go to different places? And if there are three children? Even compared to some European countries, we have fewer births per woman. One of the most important reasons - the lack of prospects for spacious housing.

A person living in a house has a different consumption: it is both a pleasure and a boon to the economy. The man lives in the house, he has a barn, garage, cellar, workshop. He bought himself a lawnmower, made a playground and purchased a garden gnome. He basically has more things in everyday life than in a small city apartment. Residents of Paris, for example, mostly live in 5–6-storey buildings, but most of the apartments come with a part of an attic or basement that helps relieve living space. In the modern mass housing you have - you, the wife and two children, and if you want to buy each bike, then the whole apartment turns into a bicycle storage.

If you live in an individual house, then there are no problems with it at all. Everyone can have a bike, but at least a motorcycle, dog booths and a tree house for children. And then older children can arrange concerts of their garage rock band, a new Steve Jobs can be born here ... For a tree house you need to buy nails, boards, you need to buy a rope ladder to this house. You have thrown this money into the economy, you are pleased with yourself, and the economy is pleased with you. You yourself are responsible for your home, no one promises you a major overhaul and you do not claim to it. All win, no matter how look.

For 30 years now, we are endlessly talking about the class of owners. For some reason, this class means entrepreneurs, oligarchs and factory owners. But the mass class of owners is the owners of the land and their homes. The connection to the land is much stronger than the connection to the plant that you did not build. Homeowners live as owners and begin to relate in a new way to both the state and their neighbors. That same sense of community is born. You do not live in an anthill, you go out into the courtyard, there your children, neighbors' children over the fence is a village in a good sense of the word. You retain all the advantages of the urban lifestyle, you use a car or public transport, but for you your community, your neighbors - this is something completely real. You - the owner - adult relations with the state. You, not Rostekhnadzor, you can get together and decide that all the roofs in the village should be of red tile. You can decide that you want to live in the village, where everyone has a lawn cut, and organize and help those who cannot cut the lawn by themselves. Only such opportunities will help to launch normal local self-government in Russia. In high-rise buildings, as is the case in Moscow, local government can be largely replaced by officials.

Do you see any practical ways to do this?

Yes, I see such ways. Number one is the massive and fundamental deregulation of this sphere. There are historical centers of cities that are important from a cultural point of view. Outside of these, you need to deregulate the construction of houses with a height of no more than three floors just cardinally. Do you own land - build whatever you want. The current regulation of individual construction is simplified, but it exists. My parents have a dacha in a rather poor holiday village, where all retired military have small two-story houses. They constantly have to interact with the state, with the architectural authorities in connection with this cottage. All papers must be in the notification order. There should be an idea that is inverse to “dacha amnesty”: there should not be such laws that a person can in principle violate whose individual property is the land. Of course, basic rules regarding property boundaries, such as red lines, must be followed. In all other respects we must proceed from the fact that man is intelligent.

Secondly, it is a mortgage rate. In general, it should be reduced for Russia, because now the minimum rate is 10.5%, and this is insanely much. For individual house-building, the rate should generally be subsidized by the state. It's not expensive. If now the inflation is 2.2%, and for the year it can be 2.5–2.8%, then the state can quite fairly give out mortgage loans tomorrow at 3% per annum. But considering how high the multiplier for construction is in the economy, we could subsidize the mortgage rate for individual housing construction. If a person wants to build a house, he should be able to take money at 1% per annum. Why is this very important, more important than the low mortgage rate for high-rise housing? When a person buys high-rise housing, he gives his money to large house-building plants. The plant purchases building materials, equipment, it is also centralized. Thus, we finance large companies. When a person is engaged in individual housing construction, he helps to de-monopolize the economy, develop small and medium businesses, develop new regional businesses, because he is looking for where it is cheaper, he works much closer with contractors, with material suppliers, he distributes money more qualitatively. This money will work better in the economy. I am sure that investments in this area will be as productive as possible. because he is looking for where it is cheaper, he works much closer with contractors, with suppliers of materials, he distributes money more qualitatively. This money will work better in the economy. I am sure that investments in this area will be as productive as possible. because he is looking for where it is cheaper, he works much closer with contractors, with suppliers of materials, he distributes money more qualitatively. This money will work better in the economy. I am sure that investments in this area will be as productive as possible.

The third is infrastructure. Roads, gas, water and everything else. Now this is a big obstacle to the development of low-rise housing. This is one of the reasons why everyone builds 25–35-storey houses. On one road they want to plant one neighborhood. Special measures are needed here, these are long infrastructure investments. Under them, the state can issue special bond programs in which large state-owned banks will participate. Here you can apply modern technology, because building a house now is not at all something like building a house 20 or 25 years ago. It is possible and individual heating system, and individual sewage system, and power supply. This industry is growing fast now. There is no need to pull the main gas to each village: New technologies make infrastructure construction cheaper and more affordable. We just have to adopt these new technologies, but I would say that people themselves will change them. A person thinks rationally, he will use new technologies to make construction cheaper for himself if we give him money for a mortgage.

I think it will surely turn out that there are still problems with the land market.

Right. The answer lies in the first paragraph, when I said about the complete deregulation. Now we will say: "Let's build all the suburbs." We will be answered: "The state body has not yet conducted a survey, it is impossible without a survey, red lines are not drawn." Even in Moscow, in multi-storey buildings, their home territory was not fixed, because there is no land survey. It needs to be deregulated. If there is a paper on the right of ownership - go build.

Moscow region is larger than Belgium; nevertheless, there is terribly expensive land, terribly expensive everything, overregulation, they require that you fulfill the formal and useless requirements of the land plots. All this needs to be radically simplified, based on the presumption of innocence of a person. That is, not a permissive procedure, but a notification one. Land in Russia, even in the Moscow region should not be so expensive, it should not be some kind of super-resource. In most cities, even in million-plus million, for 20-30 km from the border of the city already abandoned villages. However, there are so many around Moscow - abandoned villages, failed development projects. In the meantime, we are still trying to make a person arrange it all, as if it were a prize that brought millions of dollars during the Gold Rush.

It is necessary to think about the fact that people living far from the city have a job.

It will be a natural process. When new settlements appear, jobs will appear. Even now in Moscow there is such a tendency: large office centers are beginning to be located closer to the Moscow Ring Road, behind the third ring. It is convenient, no need to go to the center. In principle, the low-rise housing strategy is a strategy against over-centralization, including over-centralization of jobs. Jobs should not be only in the center. It is necessary to give people the opportunity to build as easily and cheaply as possible outside Moscow, outside the mass construction zone, as well as around any city, and jobs will begin to appear. This is not a quick process, but if we do not launch it, it will never start. With this, by the way, is the migration of the population. In the United States, an average person changes his place of residence five times in his life.

In Australia, most of all - almost 8 times in my life. In Russia, an average of 1.5 times in life. People don't move anywhere. A large number of single-story housing, low-rise housing will very much revive the housing market, help healthy population migration. Without mobility and the ability to move within the country, nothing will develop. You must live in your home in Yekaterinburg and move to the same living conditions in Nizhny Novgorod, if you have found a better job.

Our geographers say that the main migration is pendulum, that is, people travel all their life between their small city and Moscow. Worked for several months - going back.

This is a direct consequence of financial over-centralization. When all the money is in Moscow, everyone goes to work in Moscow and St. Petersburg. As long as this Putin-Kudrinsky system is not canceled, when all the funds are taken from the regions and they have neither money nor authority, it will be impossible to overcome.
https://www.inliberty.ru/article/dom-polidi/

Google käännös Navalnyn jutusta. Anyway venäläiset on vähän typeriä kun ne jatkaa tiheitten, pienten ja korkeitten asuinrakennusten rakentamista ja samaan aikaan itkee matalasta syntyvyydestä ja sosiaalisista ongelmista. Noh kustannustehokastahan se toki on, oligarkit kiittää.
All we're really doing is just fighting the clock, and it always wins.

kriittinen_ajattelija

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« Vastaus #550 : 17.04.2019, 14:08:59 »
All we're really doing is just fighting the clock, and it always wins.

kriittinen_ajattelija

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« Vastaus #551 : 22.04.2019, 21:01:40 »
Lainaus
.      … Diamond suggests that the UK should remain within the EU but, as he puts it, “talk some sense into the immigration policy”.

One of the factors that Diamond cites as important in dealing with crises is a strong national identity. The book is a forceful if rather old-fashioned argument for the continuing importance of nationhood. “Nation states are here now and they are here for the foreseeable future.”

Nor is he much interested in the intersectional approach to politics, in which struggles are delineated along gender, ethnic and cultural lines. They don’t feature in a chapter on the future of the United States. And he is not sure they should feature in the next presidential election.

“The Democrats will not win by emphasising LGBTQ issues, and similarly the best thing for members of the LGBTQ groups would be a Democratic victory, and the best way to assure a Democratic victory will be to appeal to mainstream Americans and not strong-pedal the LGBTQ issues.”

He says his editor questioned this decision to avoid minority rights, but his rationale is that “while there’s still a lot to be done, the role of women and race issues have gotten better rather than worse. Whereas the issues that I discuss are the things that are still getting worse.”

And among these issues Diamond believes is the rise of mass migration. He argues that it is a growing problem for the developed world that is widely recognised by politicians but seldom admitted publicly.

“There are about a billion Africans in Africa and almost all of them would be better off economically and politically and in terms of personal safety in Europe,” he says. “The cruel reality is that it’s impossible for Europe to admit a billion Africans but Europeans will not acknowledge this conflict between ideals and reality.”

He concedes that this stance puts him on the same side of the argument as people such as the populist Hungarian prime minister Viktor Orbán. “It’s unfortunate that people can come to a common conclusion for sensible reasons and for vile reasons,” he says. “But because of the relative lack of honest discussion, the issue has gotten hijacked by the racists, just as in the United States.”     
https://www.unz.com/isteve/jared-diamond-warns-of-immigration-from-africa/
All we're really doing is just fighting the clock, and it always wins.

KTM

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« Vastaus #552 : 23.04.2019, 21:08:54 »
Tuolta Siniset ketjusta poimittua

Lainaus
Tilastokeskus julkisti syksyllä uudet väestöennusteensa. Syntyvyys on maassamme romahtamassa ja on jo romahtanutkin. Syntyi laaja keskustelu, jossa mm. moitittiin korkeasti koulutettuja naisia tästä kehityksestä. Mutta kun tilastoja katsoo tarkemmin, suurin "synnyttämiskuoppa” löytyykin nuorten, vähän koulutettujen miesten kohdalta. Eivätkö nämä nuoret miehet halua tehdä lapsia vai eikö naiset huoli heitä lapsentekoon, en osaa sanoa. Ehkä uusi hallitus osaa

https://yle.fi/uutiset/3-10735606

Herää tietenkin kysymys kuinka synnyttämiskuoppa voi löytyä miesten puolelta? Miesten on aika vaikeaa synnyttää itse.

Mutta jotain voitaisiin varmaan tehdä, ainakin jotain auttaisi jos muualta ei tuotaisi geelitukkia kilpailemaan samoista naisista, tai sitten pitäisi tuoda vastaava määrä nuoria naisia jostain, että ylijäämämiehet voisi pariutua.

kriittinen_ajattelija

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« Vastaus #553 : 25.04.2019, 00:51:31 »
Lainaus
Vieraskielisten osuus on kasvanut pääkaupunkiseudulla 2000-luvun aikana nopeasti.

Oheiset kartat kuvaavat muutosta hyvin: vielä vuosituhannen alussa pääkaupunkiseutu oli hyvin homogeeninen, mutta vuonna 2018 pääkaupunkiseudulla oli 26 aluetta, joilla vähintään joka neljäs asukas puhui äidinkielenään jotain toista kieltä kuin suomea.

”On nähtävissä, että kantaväestön määrä vähenee alueilla, joilla ulkomaalaistaustaisen väestön osuus on suuri”, sanoo erikoistutkija Pasi Saukkonen Helsingin kaupunginkansliasta.

Äidinkielenä puhutaan kotimaisten kielten jälkeen eniten venäjää, viroa, somalia, arabiaa ja kurdia. Ne yhteensä kattavat jo puolet vieraskielisistä.

Kielten kirjo on kuitenkin paljon tätä suurempi: vuoden 2018 alussa Helsingissä oli rekisteröitynä 138 eri äidinkieltä. Tämä tarkoittaa kouluissa esimerkiksi sitä, että 20 prosenttia lapsista opiskelee suomea toisena kielenä, kun ruotsinkielisten koulujen lapsia ei oteta huomioon.

Suunnilleen puolet tästä määrästä opiskelee lisäksi omaa äidinkieltään tai kotikieltään kaupungin koulussa.

Lasten osuus kaikista helsinkiläisistä lapsista on suurempi kuin vieraskielisten osuus koko väestöstä. Pääkaupunkiseudulla on alueita, joilla yli puolet 0–6-vuotiaista lapsista on jo nyt vieraskielisiä.

Arvion mukaan vuonna 2025 noin 23 prosenttia päiväkoti-ikäisistä on vieraskielisiä ja vuonna 2035 joka kolmas alle kouluikäisistä on vieraskielinen. Valtaosa heistä syntyy Suomessa.
https://www.hs.fi/kaupunki/art-2000006075990.html
All we're really doing is just fighting the clock, and it always wins.

DuPont

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« Vastaus #554 : 25.04.2019, 01:20:57 »
Onko "kriittisen ajattelijan" esittämä näkemys kehitystä vai rappiota?
Ikävä kyllä veikkaan jälkimmäistä, koska niin paljon siirtolaisuudesta tulee yhteiskunnista, joista meidän ei tulisi ottaa mallia.
He tuovat tänne myös ne syyt, miksi heidän yhteiskuntansa eivät toimi.

no future

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« Vastaus #555 : 25.04.2019, 09:50:55 »
Suurimpien turvapaikanhakijoiden kieliryhmien (arabia, somalia, kurdi, persia) yhteenlaskettu määrä muuten on pienempi kuin venäjänkielisten määrä Suomessa. Arabian ja somalin kielisiä on vähemmän kuin vironkielisiä. Kiinan, vietnamin ja thain puhujia on yhteensä niin ikään enemmän kuin arabian tai somalin puhujia.

En löytänyt tuoretta tilastoa eu28-maiden kansalaisista Suomessa, mutta ilmeisesti virolaiset vähennettynäkin se on n. 50 000, eli saman verran mitä vironkielisiä on.

kriittinen_ajattelija

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« Vastaus #556 : 25.04.2019, 10:17:57 »
Suurimpien turvapaikanhakijoiden kieliryhmien (arabia, somalia, kurdi, persia) yhteenlaskettu määrä muuten on pienempi kuin venäjänkielisten määrä Suomessa. Arabian ja somalin kielisiä on vähemmän kuin vironkielisiä. Kiinan, vietnamin ja thain puhujia on yhteensä niin ikään enemmän kuin arabian tai somalin puhujia.

En löytänyt tuoretta tilastoa eu28-maiden kansalaisista Suomessa, mutta ilmeisesti virolaiset vähennettynäkin se on n. 50 000, eli saman verran mitä vironkielisiä on.
Juu, harmi että tilanne on toista vastasyntyneissä. Somalit, kurdit ja arabit tekee työkseen lapsia siinä missä vaikka venäläiset tai kiinalaiset ehkä yhden jos sitäkään.
All we're really doing is just fighting the clock, and it always wins.

kriittinen_ajattelija

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« Vastaus #557 : 25.04.2019, 20:43:44 »
Lainaus
In 2018 New York City (a 33% White City), Non-Whites Committed 95.4% of the Murders and 97.8% of the Nonfatal Shootings
Paul Kersey • April 23, 2019 • 300 Words • 33 Comments • Reply

Once again, black and brown people in President Trump’s hometown of New York City were busy committing almost all of the violent crime in the 33 percent white city.

It should be noted in 2018 New York City, blacks represent 22.8 percent of population, Hispanics 28.6 percent, and Asians 12.6 percent.

For homicide suspects,95.4 percent were black, Hispanic, or Asian in New York City for 2018. These statistics come courtesy of the 2018 Crime and Enforcement Activity in New York City :

Murder and Non-Negligent Manslaughter

Murder and Non-Negligent Manslaughter victims are most frequently Black (62.6%) or Hispanic (24.9%).

White victims account for (9.6%) of all Murder and Non-Negligent Manslaughter victims while Asian /Pacific Islanders account for (2.8%) of all Murder and Non-Negligent Manslaughter victims.

From the 2018 New York City Police Department “Crime and Enforcement Activity
in New York City” Report…

The race/ethnicity of known Murder and Non-Negligent Manslaughter suspects mirrors the victim population with Black (61.9%) and Hispanic (31.0%) suspects accounting for the majority of suspects. White suspects account for (5.4%) of all Murder and Non-Negligent Manslaughter suspects while Asian/Pacific Islanders accounted for (1.7%) of the known Murder and Non-Negligent Manslaughter suspects.

The Murder and Non-Negligent Manslaughter arrest population is similarly distributed. Black arrestees (60.1%) and Hispanic arrestees (33.4%) account for the majority of Murder and Non-Negligent Manslaughter arrestees while White arrestees (4.6%) and Asian/Pacific Islander (1.5%) arrestees account for the remaining portions of the Murder and Non-Negligent Manslaughter arrest population.

Note there were more white victims of homicide than suspects, meaning interracial murder was primarily non-white on white.

Also;

94.3 percent of robbery suspects in 2018 New York City were non-white.

92.8 percent of rape suspects in 2018 New York City were non-white.

97.8 percent of shooting suspects in 2018 New York City were non-white.

94.7 percent of firearm arrests in 2018 New York City were non-white.

Violent crime has a color/race in New York City, but this data is inadmissible in the court of public opinion, because it completely obliterates every conceivable egalitarian notion forced upon us by our hostile governing elite.



Lainaus
Murder and Non-Negligent Manslaughter suspects
Black 61.9%
Hispanic 31.0%
White 5.4%
Asian/Pacific Islanders 1.7%

Population percentage
Blacks 22.8%
Hispanics 28.6%
Whites at most 36%
Asians 12.6%

Population%/Suspect%

Blacks 2.71
Hispanics 0.92
Whites 0.15
Asian/Pacific Islanders 0.13
https://www.unz.com/sbpdl/in-2018-new-york-city-a-33-white-city-non-whites-committed-95-4-of-the-murders-and-97-8-of-the-nonfatal-shootings/

All we're really doing is just fighting the clock, and it always wins.

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« Vastaus #558 : 04.05.2019, 22:44:58 »
https://theconversation.com/the-us-white-majority-will-soon-disappear-forever-115894

Lainaus
The US white majority will soon disappear forever

April 30, 2019

Since the settlement of Jamestown in 1607 and the start of the Colonial period, the U.S. has been predominantly white.

But the white share of the U.S. population has been dropping, from a little under 90% in 1950 to 60% in 2018. It will likely drop below 50% in another 25 years.

(...)

When the U.S. was established as a country in 1776, whites comprised roughly 80% of the population. The white share rose to 90% in 1920, where it stayed until 1950.

Declining numbers

The proportion of whites in the U.S. population started to decline in 1950. It fell to gradually over the years, eventually reaching just over 60% in 2018 – the lowest percentage ever recorded.

Although the majority of the U.S. population today is still white, nonwhites account for more than half of the populations of Hawaii, the District of Columbia, California, New Mexico, Texas and Nevada.

And, in the next 10 to 15 years, these half dozen “majority-minority” states will likely be joined by as many as eight other states where whites now make up less than 60% of the population.

Census Bureau projections show that the U.S. population will be “majority-minority” sometime between 2040 and 2050. Our research suggests that this will happen around 2044.

Indeed, in 2020, there are projected to be more nonwhite children than white children in the U.S.

The nonwhite population is growing more rapidly than the white population. Minorities accounted for 92% of the U.S. population growth between 2010 and 2018, with Latinos comprising just under half of the nation’s overall growth.

Behind the trends

Why are the numbers of white people declining, and why are nonwhite numbers increasing? The answer is basic demography: births, deaths and immigration.

White women have an average of 1.7 children over their lifetimes, while Latina women average 2.2. The total fertility rates of blacks, Asians and American Indians are in between. So whites have fewer births than all nonwhite groups.

There are also big differences in age structure. Sixty-two percent of Latinas 15 years of age or older are of childbearing age. Only 42% of white women fall into this group. Latinos also have lower mortality rates than whites. Demographers call this the “epidemiological paradox.”

In 2015, for the first time, there were more white deaths in the U.S. than white births.

Indeed, as of 2016, in 26 states, whites were dying faster than they were being born. The states with more white deaths than white births include California, Florida, Pennsylvania and Michigan.

How about immigration to the U.S.? Of the more than 43 million foreign-born people living in the U.S. in 2015, 82% originated in Latin America and Asia. Only 11% were born in Europe. So whites don’t increase their representation in the U.S. via immigration.

The future of whiteness

The aging white population, alongside a more youthful minority population, especially in the case of Latinos, will result in the U.S. becoming a majority-minority country in around 2044.

(...)

kriittinen_ajattelija

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« Vastaus #559 : 04.05.2019, 23:35:45 »
Pari huomiota ylläolevan juttuun.

1. Monet latinot on valkoisia ainakin rodullisessa mielessä, eikä ne kulttuurillisestikaan kovin kaukana ole. Lisäksi kun esim latino mestizot risteytyy valkoisten kanssa on jälkikasvu käytännössä rodullisesti valkoista.
2. Korkein syntyvyys USA:ssa on valkoisilla ääriuskovaisilla esim mormoneilla, amisseilla, ultra-ortodoksi juutalaisilla jne ja niitten määrä on voimakkaassa kasvussa.
All we're really doing is just fighting the clock, and it always wins.

KTM

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« Vastaus #560 : 05.05.2019, 00:38:16 »
Pakko nostaa hattua Vaasan ikkunan päätoimittajalle taas kerran, hän on puhunut täyttä asiaa monta kertaa aiemminkin, ja on oikealila asiassa taas kerran.

https://www.iltalehti.fi/kotimaa/a/e8880a9e-9ce2-4aae-8a14-207016601ccd

Lainaus
Vaasalaislehden päätoimittaja kehotti miehiä ”nostamaan vaimon pöydälle ja panemaan paljaalla” – palautetta vyöryy: ”Upposi vähän omakin alus”

Tää on niitä harvoja kertoja kun voi olla ylpeä siitä että asuu Vaasassa.
« Viimeksi muokattu: 05.05.2019, 00:39:57 kirjoittanut KTM »

Tavan

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« Vastaus #561 : 05.05.2019, 06:23:04 »
Pari huomiota ylläolevan juttuun.

Huomiosi ovat lohdullisia vain geneerisestä valkonationalistisesta näkökulmasta, joka lienee Amerikan nationalistien piirissäkin oikeasti melko harvinainen. Suurin osa amerikkalaisista "valkonationalisteista" on todellisuudessa WASP-nationaliteja. He haluavat, että Amerikka on WASP:ien maa, eikä kaikkien jollain lavealla rodullisella periaatteella valkoiseksi laskettavien.

Eivät he halua WASP Amerikan korvautuvan sen paremmin juutalaisuudella, latinoudella tai slaavilaisuudella, vaikka kaikki nuo valkoisiksi laskettaisiin.
This was my father's belief and this is also mine:
  Let the corn be all one sheaf--
And the grapes be all one vine,
  Ere our children's teeth are set on edge
By bitter bread and wine.

Daghem

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« Vastaus #562 : 05.05.2019, 09:06:50 »
Jos ajatellaan turvapaikkaturismia väestönvaihdon kannalta tullaan melko nopeasti siihen lopputulokseen, että nuorten miesten osuus on selvästi vähemmän haitallinen kuin nuorten naisten osuus. Segregoituminen ja gettoutuminen johtuu pääasiassa muslimiperheistä ja niiden keskittymiseen liittyvistä lieveilmiöistä. Näin ollen haittamaahanmuuton voisi pisteyttää haitallisuusjärjestykseen esimerkiksi seuraavasti:

  • Käännynnäiset. Laitan tämän nyt kärkeen, vaikka ei sinänsä maahanmuuttoa olekaan. Kaikkein haitallisinta yhteiskunnalle on suomalainen nainen, joka kääntyy islamiin. Nämä omaksuvat käytännössä aina kaikkein ankarimman ja haitallisimman osan kulttuurista ja siirtävät sen lapsilleen.
  • Turvapaikanhakijaperheet. Perhe saa jatkaa elämäänsä samassa kokoonpanossa kuin ennenkin, eikä sisäistä painetta integraatioon synny.
  • Perheenyhdistämistapaukset. Perheenyhdistämisten kautta tulee lähes yksinomaan segregoituvaa kulttuuria kun koko yhdistettävä suku saa jatkaa elämäänsä samassa kokoonpanossa kuin ennenkin.
  • Yksin turvapaikkaa hakevat sukukypsät naiset tai tytöt. Koska miehistä on ylitarjontaa ja sekä miehet että naiset avioituvat mieluiten oman kulttuurinsa sisällä on yksittäinen nainen pitkällä tähtäimellä erityinen taakka seuraavan sukupolven huollettavien kautta.
  • Yksin turvapaikkaa hakevat miehet tai pojat. Väestönvaihdon kannalta nämä ovat ongelma vain jos löytävät puolison. Jos oman kulttuurin edustajia ei ole saatavilla, joutuvat tyytymään suomalaisiin naisiin. Näiden parien lapset tulevat kärsimään heikosta sosioekonomisesta asemastaan, mutta tulevat suurella todennäköisyydellä omaksumaan suomalaisen kulttuurin.
  • Vanhukset. Vanhuksista on tietysti taloudellista haittaa ja pelkällä olemassolollaan pitävät yllä nuorempien vanhoillista kulttuuria, mutta väestönvaihdon kannalta ovat itsestään ratkeava ongelma.
  • Toiseen suuntaan käännynnäiset. Pieni osa takapajuisista maista tulevista muslimeista (< 10%) omaksuu länsimaiset arvot ja haluaa rakentaa yhteiskuntaa niiden kautta. Nämä ovat vähiten haitallinen porukka. Jos ovat kristittyjä assimiloituvat massaan ja jos ovat muslimeja, muodostuvat tataarien kaltaiseksi sekulaariksi yhteisöksi. Tietysti näitä vainotaan omien viiteryhmiensä sisällä, joten senkin kautta tämän vähemmistön integroituminen on haastavaa.
"Vi vill erbjuda en harmonisk och trygg miljö..." - Hommas Daghem

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« Vastaus #563 : 08.05.2019, 12:59:50 »
https://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2018/05/22/what-unites-and-divides-urban-suburban-and-rural-communities/
Mielenkiintoista dataa maaseudun, kaupunkien ja nukkumalähiöiden asenteista.

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« Viimeksi muokattu: 08.05.2019, 13:02:13 kirjoittanut kriittinen_ajattelija »
All we're really doing is just fighting the clock, and it always wins.

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« Vastaus #564 : 25.05.2019, 03:20:14 »
Lainaus
    Race Differences in Ethnocentrism
Edward Dutton
Arktos, 2019.

“Those who advocate Multiculturalism seem to have lost an important instinct towards group — and thus genetic — preservation. Once a society, as a whole, espouses Multiculturalism as a dominant ideology then the society is acting against its own genetic interests and will ultimately destroy itself.”
Ed Dutton

Watching his incredibly entertaining Jolly Heretic You Tube channel, it’s easy to forget that Ed Dutton is also an extremely serious, and increasingly prolific, researcher, author, and scientist. The recent publication by Arktos of Dutton’s Race Differences in Ethnocentrism follows closely in the wake of Dutton’s At Our Wits’ End: Why We’re Becoming Less Intelligent and What it Means for the Future (2018), How to Judge People by What They Look Like (2018),  J. Phillipe Rushton: A Life History Perspective (2018),  and The Silent Rape Epidemic: How The Finns Were Groomed to Love Their Abusers (2019). In Race Differences in Ethnocentrism, Dutton, who has collaborated with Richard Lynn on a number of occasions, builds impressively on the work of the latter and has offered, in this text, one of the most informative, formidable, pressing, intriguing, and poignant monographs I’ve read in years.

Dutton’s book is a work of science underscored by an inescapable sense of social and political urgency, and has been explicitly prompted into being by the need to address two questions “particularly salient during a period of mass migration”: ‘Why are some races more ethnocentric than others?’ and, most urgently of all, ‘Why are Europeans currently so low in ethnocentrism?’ In attempting to answer these questions, Dutton has designed a book that is accessible to readers possessing even the most modest scientific knowledge, without compromising on academic rigor or the use of necessary scientific language. The text is helpfully replete with explanatory commentary and useful rhetorical illustrations, and its opening four chapters are dedicated exclusively to placing the study in context and exploring the nature of the research itself. This is a book that can, and should, be read by everyone.

In the brief first chapter, Dutton explains ethnocentrism or group pride as taking two main forms. The first, positive ethnocentrism, involves “taking pride in your ethnic group or nation and being prepared to make sacrifices for the good of it.” Negative ethnocentrism, on the other hand, “refers to being prejudiced against and hostile to members of other ethnic groups.” Typically, a highly ethnocentric person or group will demonstrate both positive and negative ethnocentrism, although it is very common for people and groups to be high in one aspect of ethnocentrism but not in the other. It is also apparent that some countries and ethnic groups are very high in both forms of ethnocentrism while others are extremely low in the same. The author sets out to explore how and why such variations and differences have occurred, and are still fluctuating. This is clearly a piece of very novel research. Dutton remarks that “there exists no systematic attempt to understand why different ethnic groups may vary in the extent to which they are ethnocentric.” Dutton’s foundation is built on a deep reading of existing literature on the origins and nature of ethnocentrism, pioneered to some extent by R. A. LeVine and D. T. Campbell in the 1970s, and built upon most recently by Australia’s Boris Bizumic. These scholars advanced the argument that ethnocentrism was primarily the result of conflict. Another highly relevant theory in the study of ethnocentrism has been the concept of ‘inclusive fitness,’ which argues that ethnocentrism provides a method for indirectly passing on one’s genes.

Dutton closes his introductory chapter by providing an interesting overview of historical observations of differences in ethnocentrism. During the so-called ‘Age of Discovery,’ Europeans encountered large numbers of different and distant tribes, and many remarked on the reception they received from these groups. Some, such as the natives of Hawaii and the Inuit were noted as being extremely friendly, while the negrito tribes of the Andaman Islands, near India, remain notoriously hostile to outsiders, shoot arrows at passing aircraft, and kill intruding foreigners, including an American missionary in November 2018. The Japanese appear throughout history to have combined a moderate level of negative ethnocentrism with very high levels of positive ethnocentrism, resulting in a society typified by high levels of social harmony and in-group co-operation, and willing sacrifice for the nation in times of war. By contrast, the Yąnomamö tribe of Venezuela are very high in negative ethnocentrism but very low in positive ethnocentrism, resulting in a society riddled with lawlessness, extreme violence, poor social harmony, and an inability to form stable social structures of any kind. Differences in general levels of ethnocentrism are important because, as Dutton points out, those societies most welcoming of outsiders were subsequently colonized and fundamentally and permanently changed by migration. Meanwhile, those societies that displayed extreme hostility to outsiders have remained almost intact, and remain unchanged even centuries after the European ‘Age of Discovery.’

In the second chapter, Dutton answers the question ‘What is ‘Race’?’ Although many of our readers will be familiar with most of the material presented in this chapter, it is nevertheless a very well-presented defense of the concept of race and its unabashed employment as a scientific system for categorizing and studying humans. In Dutton’s presentation, ‘race’ is employed to refer to what in the animal kingdom would be a subspecies: a breeding population separated from another of the same species long enough to be noticeably evolved to a different environment but not long enough to be unable to have fertile offspring with the other group. After discussing the processes through which different races or subspecies evolve, Dutton offers a summary of historical taxonomies of race, before finally answering a number of criticisms of the concept of race. In the third chapter, and following much the same framework, Dutton sets out to answer the question, ‘What is Intelligence?’ Here Dutton answers a number of criticisms of the concept of intelligence, particularly as they relate to Blacks, before moving to a discussion of race differences in intelligence. The debt to Richard Lynn’s research is quite clear in this chapter, but Dutton presents past findings with style, conviction, and novel context, meaning that familiar elements such as Cold Winters Theory are worth getting to grips with once more.

The fascinating fourth chapter is where the study begins in earnest, and answers the question ‘What Are ‘Ethnocentrism’ and ‘Ethnicity’?’ It goes without saying that both terms have entered, if not dominated, the lexicon of White advocacy, and I found it very refreshing to become more familiar with the scientific basis for them. Dutton, referring to the work of Bizumic, notes that the term ‘ethnocentrism’ was coined by the Polish sociologist Ludwig Gumplowicz (1838–1909) before entering English with the work of the American economist William Sumner (1840–1910). In order to better explain the nature of ethnocentrism, Dutton lays out various lexical definitions of ethnicity and discusses competing schools of thought in relation to the origins of ethnicity. The division between scholars of ethnicity can be broadly discussed in terms of two camps: ‘Primordialists,’ and ‘Constructivists’ or ‘Subjectivists.’ Primordialists, representing an older school of thought, assert that ethnic groups are extremely ancient and are ultimately based around common ancestry. Supporting this position, Dutton, borrowing from Frank Salter, points out that genetic data shows that ethnic groups really are distinct genetic clusters. Constructivists, on the other hand, assert that ethnic identities are merely a product of culture and environment, and are therefore arbitrary and subject to change. The author spends a great deal of time dissecting the arguments of the Constructivists and, for me personally, one of the great pleasures of Race Differences in Ethnocentrism is reading as Dutton prods and teases and the manifold weaknesses in the Constructivist position.

The author closes the chapter with an extended discussion of the sociobiological origins of ethnic identity, before providing a summary of proffered causes for ethnocentrism. These include threat and conflict, psychodynamic theory as advanced by Freud, terror management (a variation on the theme of threat and conflict), self-aggrandizement theories (ethnocentrism boosts in-group self-esteem), Marxist theory (ethnocentrism is a tactic employed by one group in order to gain power over, and exploit, another group), social dominance theory (ethnocentrism as a side-effect of certain types of personality), socialization explanations (children learn to be ethnocentric), and the sociobiological model (ethnocentrism is a product of evolution and adaptation). Dutton argues convincingly that only the sociobiological model offers answers which explain group behavior in both animals and humans, arguing that “ethnocentrism is most parsimoniously understood via a partly biological theory wherein the ethnic group is a kind of extended family.”

In the fifth chapter, Dutton surveys recent evidence for the sociobiological model of ethnocentrism and ethnicity. At the core of the chapter is J. Philippe Rushton’s ‘Genetic Similarity Theory,’ which is treated with respect but also caution by the author, who insists that “it does not fully explain all manifestations of ethnocentrism and, accordingly, it needs to be nuanced and carefully developed.” Put simply, ‘Genetic Similarity Theory’ is the idea that animals will instinctively behave more pro-socially to those who share more of their genes, and that ethnic groups, which are essentially extended families, will demonstrate the same inclination towards the genetically similar in the form of ethnic nepotism. It is this inclination to support the genetically similar that paves the way for ‘inclusive fitness’ — indirectly passing on at least some of one’s genes by supporting kin — and thus provides some explanation for the origins of altruism. Rushton provided a great deal of research strongly indicating that humans very much tend to marry, befriend, and otherwise associate with those who are genetically similar to them, and this is succinctly explored. Some controversy surrounds the issue of whether or not ‘Genetic Similarity Theory’ is applicable to circles beyond genealogical kin, and Dutton explores the work of Frank Salter in support of the idea that it is indeed applicable. The only criticism of the concept that Dutton concedes is that ‘Genetic Similarity Theory’ does not fully explain variations in ethnocentrism and therefore does not appear to attribute sufficient weight to environmental factors, especially external threats to the interests of the ethny—a factor that has demonstrably inflamed ethnocentrism throughout human history. Dutton also suggests that fluctuations in ethnocentrism may also be rooted in the dynamics of human personality, both as humans age, and as far as personality is influenced by ‘Life History Strategy.’

The sixth chapter, ‘Ethnocentrism, Personality Traits and Computer Modelling,’ focuses in detail on the issue of personality. Dutton explains that “we have to examine the concept of an ‘ethnocentric personality’ because … there are race differences in modal personality. So, if there is an ‘ethnocentric personality,’ then this would neatly explain why race differences in ethnocentrism exist.” Dutton ultimately dismisses the idea of an ‘ethnocentric personality,’ particularly the work of Adorno on prejudice, as having very little relevance to meaningful research on ethnocentrism. He concludes rather that it seems very likely that “ethnocentrism is not the by-product of a series of partly heritable personality traits.” Instead, “ethnocentrism is a human universal and is significantly genetic, in the sense that propensity to genetic similarity is partly genetic.” The chapter then moves to the concept of ‘group selection,’ during which is it explained and demonstrated that ethnocentric groups are more likely to win the battle of group selection. “The more ethnocentric group should always triumph in battles of group selection. This would mean that, all else being equal, races that were compelled, by the nature of their environment, to combat other groups (by being internally cooperative by externally hostile) would be more ethnocentric.” Computer modelling of such battles has demonstrated conclusively that ethnocentric strategies will always triumph, leading Dutton to conclude that universalist humanitarianism is ultimately a losing strategy, “unable to sustain high levels of in-group cooperation.” Humanitarian groups invariably “waste their precious reproductive potential helping out free riders who give them nothing in return.”

In Chapter 7, one of the best and most provocative in the book, Dutton explores the genetics of ethnocentrism. Dutton takes as his starting point the high level of positive and negative ethnocentrism among Northeast Asians, and attempts to find candidate genes that may play a role in producing this situation. Building on research suggesting that oxytocin may contribute to in-group bias by motivating in-group favouritism and, to a lesser extent, out-group hostility, Dutton points to scholarly findings that Northeast Asians disproportionately possess (“much higher than Europeans”) genes identified with fear of social exclusion and higher oxytocin levels (A118G – OPRM1). Further research has indicated that the serotonin transporter gene polymorphism (5-HTTLPR) combines with environmental factors to shape in-group bias. Dutton cites studies showing that “70–80 percent of an East Asian sample carried the short form of this gene, that is to say the form that makes you more ethnocentric. Only 40–45 percent of Europeans in the sample carried the short form of the gene. Indeed, it was found that across twenty-nine nations, the more collectivist a culture was the more likely it was to have the short form as the prevalent allele in the population.” Dutton adds that his own work found such correlations to be weak, and he is reluctant to attribute ethnocentrism to small numbers of specific genes. He instead finishes the chapter with the suggestion that specific genes such as these may play a small role, but only in conjunction with Life History Theory—for example, he provides data suggesting that populations with Slow Life History strategies (typified by higher intelligence, delayed gratification, and higher investment in children) are likely to be higher in positive ethnocentrism.

In Chapter 8, Dutton presents data on race differences in ethnocentrism, and he then explores the impact of cousin marriage and religion on ethnocentrism. The chapter opens with a very interesting discussion of racial dating preferences derived from the OKCupid dating site. The data suggest that, at least in sexual terms, White women were the most ethnocentric group, overwhelmingly preferring to date men from their own ethnic group. By contrast, most non-White groups seemed to have a preference for dating Whites. Dutton explains that this data cannot be meaningfully employed in the study of ethnocentrism because the fact non-Whites want to have sex with Whites merely means that “Whites have value.” He continues: “this does not, of course, mean that black people would be necessarily more inclined to lay down their lives for white people, show preference for white interests over those of their own race, vote for whites over members of their own race or any other behaviour of that kind that might be regarded as low in ethnocentrism.” Dutton instead utilizes the ‘World Values Survey’ as a more reliable indicator of ethnocentric feeling, and finds that East Asians are among the most ethnocentric populations. At this stage, the author returns to Genetic Similarity Theory, pointing out that the East Asian gene pool is much smaller than the European gene pool — in other words, two random Japanese men will be more closely related than two random English men. This is important because

    any act of ethnic altruism by the Japanese man would have a greater payoff in terms of inclusive fitness than would precisely the same act by an Englishman. As such, we would expect higher levels of positive ethnocentrism among Northeast Asians than among Europeans. By the same token, were a Japanese person to be confronted by a foreigner, this would potentially damage his genetic interests to a greater extent than would be the case if a European, from a larger gene pool, was confronted by a foreigner.

Genetic Similarity Theory, as outlined above, is particularly salient in Dutton’s discussion of ethnocentrism among Arabs and South Asians, populations with high levels of cousin marriage. Arabs and South Asians are more ethnocentric than Europeans but, unlike East Asians, the nature of Arab and South Asian ethnocentrism tends more towards negative ethnocentrism — something Dutton links to relatively lower average intelligence. Consanguineous marriage, itself a response to a stressful and/or conflict-riven ecology and a means of developing a functioning society in populations with Fast Life History strategies, will accelerate and deepen negative ethnocentrism.

This phenomenon is deepened further by high levels of religiosity, which, Dutton argues, has been demonstrated as boosting both positive and negative ethnocentrism. Among the aspects of religion that contribute to ethnocentrism and group selection, Dutton cites high levels of fertility, matrimony, physical punishment of children, bodily mutilation, honor killing, martyrdom, celibacy, and intense violence or enmity directed at non-believers. I found Dutton’s work here to be especially interesting, though I was left with some significant questions about the nature of modern Christianity, something disappointingly absent from Dutton’s text despite his rich background in the study of Christian fundamentalists. Why is modern Christianity so entirely lacking in ability to promote any kind of ethnocentrism? My own instinct is that it has something to do with the development and spread of the belief in a “personal Jesus,” a largely nineteenth-century American innovation, rather than the older belief in folding oneself into a community of believers under a more distant and overarching God of nations. But this would require an essay, or several, to fully articulate, rather than an aside in a book review. It should suffice to state here that more detail or illustration from Dutton in this regard would have been most welcome.

Dutton spends several pages discussing Jewish ethnocentrism, and is appreciative of the work of Kevin MacDonald in this area. Jews are clearly very high in positive ethnocentrism, as demonstrated by very high levels of in-group philanthropy, belief in themselves as members of a Chosen People with a special world-historical destiny, and the prolific production of self-congratulatory and apologetic literature about themselves that is frequently accompanied by a widespread refusal to make any concessions on negative aspects of the history of the ethnic group. Jews have also distinguished themselves throughout history with very high levels of negative ethnocentrism, including their genocides of other peoples (real or imagined) in their religious texts, very negative portrayals of non-Jews in their religious commentaries, frequent outbursts against Greek cultural influence in the Classical period, exploitative economic relationships with Europeans since at least the Carolingian dynasty, the preference for suicide over conversion in the Medieval period, high levels of culturally disruptive behaviors among host populations in the modern period, and most recently their extraordinarily hostile treatment of the Palestinians. This can be partly explained, as Dutton points out, by the highly consanguineous nature of the Jews. For example, “it has been found that the world’s 10 million Ashkenazi Jews are all descended from about 350 Ashkenazi Jews who found themselves in Eastern Europe about the year 1400.” High levels of inbreeding have led to the noted prevalence of several genetic disorders among the Jews, including Tay-Sachs Disease, Gaucher’s Disease, and Riley-Day Syndrome. Dutton argues that Jews would have been more ethnocentric than Europeans from the earliest stages of their settlement in Europe, and that this ethnocentrism would have been deepened even further over historical time, in successive cycles, by their continued breeding within a small gene pool (intensifying the impact of Genetic Similarity Theory) and their presence in a high stress environment typified by periodic outbursts of reactive persecution (resulting in “harsh selection” for the most ethnocentric Jews). Dutton then discusses the findings of one study carried out by developmental psychologists, in which it was found that Israeli infants displayed unusually intense fear reactions in response to strangers when compared with North German infants. Whereas the North German infants had relatively minor reactions to strangers, the Israeli infants became “inconsolably upset.”

The author brings his eighth chapter to a close with a discussion of low ethnocentrism among Europeans and sub-Saharan Africans. Low ethnocentrism among Africans is explained briefly via their very pronounced r-strategy, resulting in low rates of consanguineous marriage and a much broader gene pool and genetic diversity. On the other hand, Europeans, argues Dutton, occupy a ‘Goldilocks Zone’ of very low ethnocentrism because they are less K-selected than East Asians, have a larger gene pool, and their environment is less harsh, leading to lower levels of group selection. There appears to be a position on the r–K spectrum, lower than East Asian K strategies, where cousin marriage is selected for (boosting ethnocentrism) and this position is occupied by Arabs and South Asians rather than Whites, who instead occupy a position below East Asians but above Arabs and South Asians. The trade-off for this relatively weakened position of Europeans is that for a population with moderate-to-high intelligence, “low ethnocentrism would permit a greater ability to trade and pool resources and so, ultimately, the creation of an extremely large coalition with a very large gene pool. This group would be more likely than a smaller group to produce geniuses.”

Dutton thus argues that, in a sense, some level of selection took place for low ethnocentrism in Europeans — a “genius” group evolutionary strategy. Dutton argues that groups with high levels of genius but low levels of ethnocentrism will triumph over groups with high levels of ethnocentrism but low levels of genius so long as certain conditions are met. The most important condition is that the genius group should maintain a basic level of ethnocentrism. Should this base level decline or collapse, the genius strategy would fail and highly ethnocentric groups would eventually dominate. European ethnocentrism has clearly been stronger in the past than it is at present, a fact the author very capably discusses within the framework of broader fluctuations in ecology (especially the advent of the industrial revolution) and ongoing evolutions in race itself.

In Chapter 9, Dutton explores in detail several variables that may impact ethnocentrism at individual and group level. Highly stressful situations in which survival is at risk have been shown to boost ethnocentrism, and researchers have found that playing violent video games is even sufficient to increase aggression to perceived out-groups. Mortality salience, or the fear of death, has also been shown to lead people to believe in a way which is highly defensive of their in-group. Although Dutton does not explore the theme in any great depth, I was moved to reflect on how anti-stress Western civilization has become during the last 60 or so years, not only in terms of industrialization, radically lowered infant mortality, and medical advances (all of which Dutton explores), but also in the extraordinary emphasis placed by modern culture on individual transient pleasures and prolonging youth (and therefore delaying or avoiding confronting death). Decadence, which is what such a culture essentially decays into, is therefore obstructive or oppositional to the development of ethnocentrism, and ‘weaponized decadence’ therefore strikes me as a particularly useful strategy that could be employed by a highly ethnocentric group with significant cultural influence in a host society with pre-existing moderate-to-low levels of ethnocentrism — a way of pushing a stronger “genius evolutionary strategist” into a fatally lower level of ethnocentrism and thus, ultimately, into defeat and destruction. Other variables impacting upon levels of ethnocentrism, and discussed by Dutton, include age, gender, pregnancy, intelligence and education, and ethnic diversity.

I found the last of these the most salient. Dutton, following from Vanhanen and Salter, argues that multi-ethnic societies are much less capable of successfully defending themselves against incursion from outsiders. This is for three key interrelated reasons. The first is lower levels of trust, as sapped confidence in one’s group leads to radically fewer sacrifices on behalf of the group. The second is that a multi-ethnic society will be able to draw on significantly lower reserves of positive ethnocentrism. The third is that ethnic minorities will tend to support immigration, essentially acting as a fifth column; allies to the outsiders engaged in incursion. So much for the “diversity is our greatest strength” mantra.

In the penultimate chapter, Dutton makes the argument that the industrial revolution and its consequences have been a disaster for European ethnocentrism. Industrialization has significantly reduced human ecological stress in the West, and has accelerated the decline of European religion — one of the key supports for an already low level of European ethnocentrism. Advances in medicine and developments in the welfare state have led to wholesale dysgenic impacts such as the extraordinary rise in numbers of people with moderate to severe genetic disorders (26 percent increase in hemophilia, 22 percent increase in cystic fibrosis, and a 300 percent increase in phenylketonuria). The author posits that the increased proliferation of unhealthy mutations has further precipitated the decline of healthy instincts rooted in healthy genes that promoted survival (on a related note, it is interesting that those identified as ethnocentric score very highly in disgust sensitivity—a trait associated with disease avoidance). Dutton and some of his colleagues have come to describe such negative mutations as “spiteful mutations” which “cause people to act against their own genetic interests.” He continues:

If [carriers of ‘spiteful genes’] influence society, they can persuade even non-carriers of these ‘spiteful’ genes to act in self-destructive ways and they can undermine structures — such as religion — which help to promote group interests. Woodley of Menie et al. call this ‘social epistasis.’ As a consequence, modern (liberal) religion and ideology — far from being an indirect means of genetic preservation — would in fact reflect a sick society’s growing desire to destroy itself. An obvious example can be seen in the ideology of Multiculturalism and Political Correctness.

In Dutton’s reading of our present situation then, the worst of our traitors are in fact what perhaps Nietzsche was referring to when he condemned “the botched and the bungled” — malformed and maladapted offspring eager for self-destruction, and dragging the healthy down with them.

The final, brief, chapter of Race Differences in Ethnocentrism offers a neat summary of the findings and central arguments of the book before ending on a warning and offering some meagre light at the end of the tunnel. The warning is clear:

    Europe is increasingly allowing into its borders people who are extremely high in ethnocentrism as predicted by their high levels of religiousness, low median age, their practice of cousin marriage, low average intelligence, and (likely) low mutational load. We have noted that the ethnocentric strategy will, eventually, tend to dominate all other strategies in the battle for group survival. Alternate strategies can also work, such as the development of large and highly inventive coalitions, but these cannot last if they promote ideologies which are actively to the detriment of their genetic interests, as it happening with Political Correctness, which actively promotes an effective destruction of European people.

And yet this may be a night that is necessary before the dawn, as Europeans are once more plunged into a cleaning cauldron of harsh, selective conditions:

    We are now living under these conditions. But it will be the collapse of [European] civilisation and power that will likely lead, many years hence, to their becoming more ethnocentric once again.

It is the humbling, unenviable, and largely thankless task of websites like The Occidental Observer to convince European peoples, wherever they are, that ethnocentrism is an option that should be taken now, before catastrophe makes that choice for them. Edward Dutton’s remarkable book lends powerful support to that cause.     
https://www.theoccidentalobserver.net/2019/05/23/review-of-ed-duttons-race-differences-in-ethnocentrism/
All we're really doing is just fighting the clock, and it always wins.

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« Vastaus #565 : 28.05.2019, 15:33:23 »
Tuukka Kuru:
Syntyperä kulttuurin rakennusaineena

Lainaus
Nykyinen kehitys tarkoittaakin käytännössä sitä, että eurooppalaisten vuosisatoja asuttamat ja kehittämät maat muuttuvat muutamassa vuosikymmenessä etnisiksi tilkkutäkeiksi, joita asuttavilla kansoilla ei ole mitään historiallista, geneettistä tai kulttuurillista sidettä Eurooppaan. Tätä kehitystä voidaan täysin oikeutetusti kutsua valkoisten kansojen etniseksi itsemurhaksi.

Edellä mainittu väestökehitys ei ainoastaan muovaa kohdemaiden kansalaisten ulkonäköä, musiikkimakua ja ruokailutottumuksia, vaikka nämä ulkoiset seikat toimivatkin usein perusteluina kantakulttuurin muuttamiselle. Näiden ulkoisten ja toissijaisten muutosten rinnalle nousevat myös ne piilevät väestölaadulliset erot ja ominaisuudet, jotka on koodattu jokaisen ihmisryhmän ja niiden jäsenen perimään. Nämä erot antavat myös vihjeitä siitä, minkälaisia sosiaalisia haasteita maahanmuuton kohdemaat tulevaisuudessa kohtaavat.

Roturyhmien välisiä eroja henkisissä kompetenssissa ja menestyksessä voidaan tutkia niissä yhteiskunnissa, joissa ne elävät rinnakkain. Charles Murrayn ja Richard Herrnsteinin tekemien tutkimusten perusteella yksilön älykkyysosamäärä on yksi tärkeimmistä mitattavista muuttujista, jotka ennustavat hänen taloudellista ja yhteiskunnallista menestystään. Ei siten ole kovinkaan yllättävää, että valkoisissa ja itäaasialaisissa korkean tuottavuuden yhteiskunnissa ihmisten keskimääräinen älykkyysosamäärä on korkea (valkoisilla noin 100, itäaasialaisilla 105), ja alkeellisten yhteiskuntien asukkailla, kuten monissa afrikkalaisissa maissa, alle 80. Älykkyys on myös vahvasti periytyvä ominaisuus, minkä vuoksi sitä on hankala muuttaa ympäristöä kontrolloimalla. Korkea keskimääräinen älykkyys ensinnäkin mahdollistaa kehittyneiden maiden sivistyksen ja korkean tuottavuuden, ja toisaalta se on niiden ylläpitämisen ehdoton vaatimus. Kehittyneiden yhteiskuntien infrastruktuuri, energiantuotanto, lääketiede, tieteellinen tutkimus, internet, toimivien jakeluverkkojen ylläpito ja muut modernin elämän kannalta välttämättömät asiat vaativat korkeaa osaamistasoa ja lukeneisuutta, ja niitä voi esiintyä ainoastaan keskimääräiseltä älykkyystasoltaan riittävän korkeissa yhteiskunnissa.
En halua Euroopan yhteiskuntien muuttuvan sellaisiksi kuin Afrikan ja Lähi-idän yhteiskunnat. En usko afrikkalaisten ja lähi-itämaalaisten käyttäytyvän Euroopassa eri tavalla kuin Afrikassa ja Lähi-idässä. Tästä syystä vastustan Afrikan ja Lähi-idän väestöjen siirtymistä Eurooppaan.

kriittinen_ajattelija

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« Vastaus #566 : 17.06.2019, 00:28:43 »
Lainaus
.    The percentage of men under the age of 30 who report not having had sex in at least a year came in at 28% in 2018, the highest figure ever recorded in that age range since the survey first began asking about sexual frequency in the late eighties (N = 2,818). From 1989 through 2012, the under-30 incel percentage remained steady, averaging 13%*. Then in 2014 it shot up to a new high of 21%, notched up again to 22% in 2016, and then as mentioned hit another new all-time high in 2018 at 28%.   
https://www.unz.com/anepigone/incel-epidemic/
Suomessa saattaa olla lukema paljon isompi kuin jenkeissä, koska olemme introvertimpaa kansaa. 35-40% kenties?
« Viimeksi muokattu: 17.06.2019, 00:30:22 kirjoittanut kriittinen_ajattelija »
All we're really doing is just fighting the clock, and it always wins.

Skeptikko

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« Vastaus #567 : 17.06.2019, 13:34:50 »
Suomi houkuttelee irakilaisia ja venäläisiä, HS:n laskuri kertoo, kuinka paljon maahanmuuttajia kuntaasi asettuu
https://www.hs.fi/kotimaa/art-2000006145312.html

Lainaus
Suomen saapuvien maahanmuuttajien määrä väheni vuonna 2018. Eniten Suomeen muutettiin Irakista. Suomeen saapui viime vuonna lähes 1 800 irakilaista.

SUOMEN muuttovoitto väheni viime vuonna. Syynä muuttovoiton vähenemiseen oli maahanmuuton väheneminen ja maastamuuton lisääntyminen.

Suomen saama muuttovoitto koostui lähes täysin EU:n ulkopuolelta tulleista muuttajista. Viime vuonna Suomeen muutti Tilastokeskuksen mukaan kuitenkin aiempaa vähemmän ihmisiä EU:n ulkopuolelta. Toisaalta muutto EU:n ulkopuolisiin maihin oli suurempaa kuin vuotta aiemmin.

Tilastokeskuksen mukaan Suomen saama muuttovoitto vuonna 2018 oli 19 prosenttia vähemmän kuin edellisenä vuonna. Suomen muuttovoitto oli viime vuonna 11 958, kun edellisvuonna se oli 14 824.

SUOMEEN muutti ulkomailta hieman yli 31 106 henkeä vuonna 2018, kun taas Suomesta muutti ulkomaille oli 19 148 henkeä.

Ulkomailta Suomeen muuttaneiden määrä väheni 691:llä. Maahanmuuttajista oli ulkomaan kansalaisia 23 146, eli 74 prosenttia vuonna 2018. Suomen maastamuuton kasvu ulkomaille oli 2 175 henkeä, 13 prosenttia edellisvuotta enemmän. Maastamuuttajista 60 prosenttia, 11 538, oli Suomen kansalaisia. Ulkomaan kansalaisista Suomi sai muuttovoittoa 15 536 henkeä, mutta oman maan kansalaisista tuli 3 578 hengen muuttotappio.

Maahanmuuton netto EU:n ulkopuolisesta muutosta väheni 12  733:een, kun se edellisvuonna oli 13 596 henkeä.

Maahanmuuton voitto oli suurin Irakin kansalaisista, 1 797 muuttajaa ja toiseksi suurin Venäjän kansalaisista, 1 240 muuttajaa. Kansalaisuudeltaan tuntemattomista Suomi sai kolmanneksi eniten muuttovoittoa, 750 muuttajaa.
« Viimeksi muokattu: 17.06.2019, 13:36:53 kirjoittanut Skeptikko »
En homona toivota tervetulleiksi Suomeen henkilöitä, jotka haluavat tappaa minut:
http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-33565055

Tanskan pakolaisapu: hallitsematon tulijatulva johtamassa armageddoniin ja yhteiskuntamme tuhoon:
http://jyllands-posten.dk/international/europa/ECE7963933/Sammenbrud-truer-flygtningesystem/

DuPont

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« Vastaus #568 : 17.06.2019, 21:38:12 »
Ja millä perusteilla tulevat irakilaiset Suomeen? Perusteilla, jotka riittäisivät estämään maahantulon, jos haluttaisiin.

Pullervo

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« Vastaus #569 : 19.06.2019, 08:49:18 »
Tilastokeskus julkisti tänään 19.6.2019 tilaston Väestörakenne 2018 (pdf, 22 s.). Ohessa lyhyt lainaus alusta sekä kolme graafia.

Ei liene mitään uutta tai yllättävää – alueellisesti ulkomaalaisia on esim. pk-seudulla liikaa ja afrikkalaisten määrä kasvaa toisessa mamupolvessa. On huonoa maahanmuuttoa ja sitten sen lisäksi surkeaa maahanmuuttoa.

Väestörakenne 2018

Ulkomaalaistaustainen väestö


Ulkomaalaistaustaisten määrä ylitti 400 000 rajan

Tilastokeskuksen mukaan Suomessa asui vuoden 2018 lopussa 402 619 ulkomaalaistaustaista henkilöä, mikä oli 7,3 prosenttia koko väestöstä. Ensimmäisen polven eli ulkomailla syntyneitä ulkomaalaistaustaisia oli 335 414 ja toisen polven eli Suomessa syntyneitä 67 205. Ulkomaalaistaustaisten määrä on kaksinkertaistunut kymmenessä vuodessa.

Afrikkalaistaustaisten osuus suurenee toisessa polvessa

Vuoden 2018 lopussa ensimmäisen polven ulkomaalaistaustaisista eurooppalaistaustaisten osuus oli yli puolet (55 prosenttia). Aasialaistaustaisten osuus oli 29 ja afrikkalaistaustaisten osuus 11 prosenttia.

Suomessa syntyneistä ulkomaalaistaustaisista eurooppalaistaustaisten osuus oli 48 prosenttia, aasialaistaustaisten osuus 27 ja afrikkalaistaustaisten osuus 22 prosenttia. Afrikkalaistaustaisten osuus ulkomaalaistaustaisista on kaksinkertainen toisessa polvessa.

Venäjän tai entisen Neuvostoliiton taustamaanaan omaavat suurin ryhmä

Ulkomaalaistaustaisista selvästi suurin ryhmä olivat henkilöt, joiden taustamaa oli Venäjä tai entinen Neuvostoliitto. Heitä oli vuoden 2018 lopussa 85 534, mikä on viidesosa kaikista ulkomaalaistaustaisista.

Seuraavaksi suurimmat ryhmät olivat virolaistaustaiset, 49 989 henkilöä, irakilaistaustaiset, 22 336 ja somalialaistaustaiset, 20 723 henkilöä.

Joka kymmenes alle kouluikäinen on ulkomaalaistaustainen, pääkaupunkiseudulla jo joka neljäs

Ensimmäisen polven ulkomaalaistaustaisten keski-ikä oli 38,2 vuotta vuonna 2018, kun koko väestön keski-ikä oli 42,9 vuotta. Suomalaistaustaisten keski-ikä oli 43,6 vuotta. Toisen polven ulkomaalaistaustaisten keski-ikä oli 11 vuotta.

Alle kouluikäisistä (0–6-vuotiaat) ulkomaalaistaustaisten osuus oli vuoden 2018 lopussa 10,3 prosenttia. Pääkaupunkiseudulla alle kouluikäisistä jo joka neljäs on ulkomaalaistaustainen.

(...)

e:typotus + lisää lihavointia
« Viimeksi muokattu: 19.06.2019, 08:56:55 kirjoittanut Pullervo »
Kun allah saapuu kaupunkiin
Turkuun, Barcelonaan, Berliiniin,
Brysseliin, Tukholmaan, Pariisiin,
Madridiin, Nizzaan, Manchesteriin,
Pietariin, Lontooseen, New Yorkin World Trade Centeriin...